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Abstract 
Classical realism and Morgenthau in particular have recently experienced a revived interest 
in IR. The evolving debate has helped to contextualise and reconstruct Morgenthau’s 
thought which until now had been misrepresented in structural realist and early post-
structuralist interpretations. However, despite all of its achievements, we have yet to draw 
more attention to Morgenthau’s contribution to contemporary IR-theory. To contribute to 
the closing of this research gap this article considers a set of questions which Morgenthau 
himself asked at the beginning of his career as its conceptual framework. It is argued that 
Morgenthau was particularly concerned with the de-humanisation of socio-political life in 
modern democracies evoked through processes of ideologisation, technologisation, and 
scientification, which he countered by focusing on a re-introduction of the human factor to 
politics. This demonstrates that Morgenthau’s work is a rich source for IR-theory because 
his intellectual agenda was driven by concerns similar to what we find in post-structuralism. 
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The debate on Hans Morgenthau in the context of realism has demonstrated through a con-
textualisation and more comprehensive reading that his Weltanschauung was far more ec-
lectic than structural realism and early post-structuralism led students of International Rela-
tions (IR) to believe.1 It would be impossible to do justice here to all the achievements of 
this debate and therefore this article will refrain from selective name-dropping. Currently, 
this debate is intensifying as scholars investigate to what extent Morgenthau’s thought can 
make a contribution to contemporary IR-theory. This inquisitive step is indispensible, as Ian 
Hall (2011: 49) rightfully contends: ‘[r]ealism is best understood not as a perennial mode of 
international thought …, but as a particular, twentieth-century response to a particular set 
of events.’ In order to demonstrate that realism is still significant, despite its particularity, 
William Scheuerman (2011) recently argued that it is an important corrective for cosmopoli-
tanism; however, it was Richard Lebow (2003) who initiated this research interest by show-
ing that Morgenthau considered humans to be in a tragic state. Despite the human urge for 
certainty, Lebow argues that order is no more than an expression of the momentum of par-
ticular human interaction and consequently any attempt to permanently master the social 
life-world is in vain. Lebow’s exploration of the realist insistence on human tragedy encour-
ages further development of the various ontological and primarily epistemological links be-
tween ‘wilful’ (Williams 2005) or ‘progressive’ (Scheuerman 2011) realism and any other IR-
theory which is orientated towards the human, for example post-structuralism or critical 
theory.  
Advancing the research agenda outlined by Lebow, this article argues that the central aspect 
of Morgenthau’s Weltanschauung is the human condition of politics. This entails an episte-
mological aspect because for Morgenthau politics is created through human interaction. 
Only when people congregate to pursue their interests in the form of a dialogue did Mor-
genthau speak of politics. Consequently, he did not conceptualise politics as a system, but 
rather saw it as fluid whilst its temporality and spatiality have to be acknowledged. Fur-
thermore, the human condition of politics entails a normative aspect. For Morgenthau, hu-
man tragedy was caused less by the fact that humans will never be able to control their life-
world than the fact that in modern democracies attempts to do so were made that threat-
ened to abolish such dialogues and eventually politics altogether.  
In the examination of this central aspect of Morgenthau’s Weltanschauung, this article will 
paraphrase questions that have prompted Morgenthau’s 1933 study La Notion du Politique. 
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These questions not only lend themselves as a conceptual framework, but also provide evi-
dence that the concepts this article deals with are neither selectively chosen, nor insignifi-
cant to Morgenthau’s Weltanschauung.2 Rather, he engaged with them throughout his ca-
reer. Certainly, a focus on Morgenthau’s European writings bears the risk of being unable to 
demonstrate the centrality for Morgenthau of the human condition of politics, but a com-
prehensive analysis of his œuvre demonstrates that Morgenthau showed a striking continui-
ty of thought throughout his life, despite its numerous caesura. The most forceful evidence 
of this has been provided by Morgenthau himself in the preface to his final monograph Sci-
ence: Servant or Master? (1972: XXI) in which he noted that its first part was based on his 
manuscript Über den Sinn der Wissenschaft in dieser Zeit und über die Bestimmung des 
Menschen (On the Meaning of Scholarship in this Time and on Human Destiny) written in 
1934. 
The first of the questions considered by Morgenthau revolves around the construction of 
society. This, called sociation (Vergesellschaftung) by Georg Simmel (1908: 5), had gained 
for Morgenthau (1976) such momentum in modern democracies that it led to de-
humanisation through three reifications: ideologisation, technologisation, and scientifica-
tion3. The second question Morgenthau elaborated upon stresses the consequences mod-
ern democracies face due to de-humanisation. It is argued that Morgenthau was concerned 
with this ill-balanced sociation favouring the structure, and that he believed it had led to a 
de-politicisation of the social realm that could eventually threaten the existence of democ-
racies altogether. Finally, it is demonstrated that Morgenthau provided with the human 
condition of politics not only a normative corrective for modern democracies, but was also 
concerned about its empirical feasibility. In order to counter this de-humanisation and sub-
sequent de-politicisation, Morgenthau proposed the national interest as an epistemological 
tool in order to ensure the political and scholarship as dissidence in order to restore the 
political. Due to practical concerns, this discussion cannot assess their feasibility; however, 
in the conclusion an outlook for further engagement with Morgenthau will be provided. 
 
De-humanisation in modern democracies 
In his own time, Morgenthau was not the only scholar arguing that modern sociation had 
become imbalanced through the removal of spatial and temporal particularities of social life 
in favour of structural consolidations. This process, which is termed de-humanisation here, 
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was criticised by a group of European émigré scholars and their like-minded American peers 
such as Kenneth Thompson and William Fox in their attempt to establish an IR-theory to 
counter the dominance of positivism. Morgenthau noted that he was ‘inclined to think that 
the recently fashionable types of research such as systems theory, game theory, and behav-
iouralism will decline because of their sterility which is now increasingly being recognised’ 
(HJM 9).4 Still, as Nicolas Guilhot’s (2008: 282) term for this group, ‘separationist movement’, 
indicates, IR remained deeply enmeshed with governmental institutions that kept the disci-
pline to be ‘driven by demand’ (Kahler 1997: 22) and did not allow scholars to fundamental-
ly divert from the beaten tracks. 
That this revival did not occur during Morgenthau’s lifetime is explained in Stanley Hoff-
mann (1977: 42-3) and Ekkehart Krippendorff’s (1989: 31-3) assessment of IR as an Ameri-
can discipline. In their view, the USA had had little experience with the typical conflicts that 
had influenced politics in Europe, and positivism seemed to be an appropriate means to 
satisfy America’s liberal democratic zeal. Recently, Seán Molloy (2003: 72) came to a similar 
conclusion, arguing that ‘[w]ithout a tradition of international involvement, the Americans 
were forced to rely on the Enlightenment ideology of reason and its 19th century successor, 
positivistic science, as the key to effective, rational practice in international relations.’ 
Consequently, Morgenthau gradually became out-dated and marginalised5 in IR as evi-
denced in the circumstances of his retirement from the University of Chicago in 1971. A 
commentary in the student newspaper, Chicago Maroon, indicates that Morgenthau would 
have liked to stay at the university despite having reached the official retirement age (HJM 
86). However, this request was turned down, which demonstrates Morgenthau’s declining 
academic standing. This gradual academic marginalisation caused Morgenthau resentment, 
which is why he turned down an offer from the American University in April 1970 to become 
dean of their School of International Service pointing out that there were times he would 
have been honoured to accept, but that these times had passed (HJM 5). 
Morgenthau’s academic marginalisation is not merely a tragic episode in the life of a scholar, 
but it is a symbol for the de-humanisation of social life at large. This article will demonstrate 
that this marginalisation was unjustified, that he, along with other émigré scholars, was 
ahead of his time in the discipline, and that the influence of the German intellectual tradi-
tion on (international) political theorising in the 20th century (Shilliam, 2009; Bell 2009: 7; 
Guilhot 2011: 9-10) is also of particular importance in the 21st century. This will be accom-
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plished through the exploration of Morgenthau’s reasoning of the removal of the human 
factor whilst analogies to current scholarship will also be developed. This de-humanisation 
occurred in the course of the 20th century because nation-states, as the major actors in in-
ternational relations, had an interest in maintaining the status quo. As a result, structural 
consolidations transformed the individual’s role from that of creator of social life to its mere 
executor because the insight that the human ‘cosmos [is] in flux’ (Mannheim 1985: 65) had 
vanished from his/her mind. To Morgenthau (1950a), de-humanisation became so extensive 
that it affected international politics as well as the discipline. In Morgenthau’s (1969: 13) 
view, the climax of de-humanisation occurred during the Vietnam War, when its success 
was measured through “body counts”. Killing humans became the quantifiable end through 
which the implementation of foreign policy strategies could be scientifically assessed. Three 
forms of reification in particular led to this de-humanisation: ideologisation, technologisa-
tion, and scientification.  
 
Ideologisation. While Morgenthau was particularly concerned about nationalism, he re-
mained sceptical about the promises of any ideology. At the beginning of his career, Mor-
genthau (1930c) pursued psychological enquiries into the ideological causes of the First 
World War. He concluded that the cultural crisis at the fin de siècle had shattered traditional 
forms of masculinity and that nationalism had risen due to its promise to resurrect the male 
identity. This experience with nationalism fortified his distrust in ideologies and explains 
why Morgenthau understood Politics Among Nations ‘as a temporary and historically caused 
counter-ideology to the ideologies of the 20th century’ (Behr 2010: 138) rather than a theory 
of international politics. Subsequently, Morgenthau returned to the consequences of ideo-
logies for humans and argued that the ideological takeover of reality would cause two inter-
connected, de-humanising problems. 
First, Morgenthau (1960a) argued that ideologies promote creative mediocrity. Humans are 
not able to fully utilise all of their creative abilities within ideological frameworks, as they 
are established to create a discourse of legitimacy for the current political order. People 
yield to the temptation of ideologies because they furnish them, in their yearning to give 
meaning to the social world and establish their identity within it, with the ‘ontological secu-
rity’ (Giddens 1984: 375) that allows them to do so. Therefore, the retention of social struc-
tures is a vital expression of this legitimacy and security. An alteration of these structures 
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through the creative abilities of humans would mean that people are threatened with the 
loss of their ontological security due to changes in the reification of their thought which in 
turn undermines the ideological legitimacy. Consequently, the creative abilities of humans 
are relegated to supporting the ideologised reality by constraining them into a bureaucratic 
order in which alternative realities are suppressed. Morgenthau’s criticism is similar here to 
Jenny Edkins’s (1999: 142) exhortation in her assessment of the post-structuralist move-
ment that IR-theorists should render visible ‘the contingent, provisional nature’ of political 
order.  
Second, Morgenthau also asserted that ideologies promote intellectual mediocrity because 
conflicting Weltanschauungen challenge the political order and cannot be tolerated. Mor-
genthau’s criticism of ideologies indicates the implications of the concepts of inclusion and 
exclusion (Nassehi 2004) as discussed in sociological discourses. Paul Hirst (2001: 53) noted 
that nationalism operates on dichotomous perceptions of otherness to create homogeneity 
within a nation-state, allowing a particular group to uphold the political order by monopolis-
ing narratives of reality. In fact, Hirst’s assessment is an apt one for any ideological system. 
Anyone who challenges these narratives through his/her beliefs, knowledge, or even exist-
ence has to be excluded. This exclusion may range from criminalisation to expulsion and 
even extinction, as was the case under fascism and communism. Morgenthau observed this 
firsthand at a soirée in Munich in 1935 hosted by the jurist Karl Neumeyer at which the oth-
er guests remained largely indifferent to the news of the execution of a befriended Jewish 
lawyer (Postscript 1984: 363-4). That evening showed Morgenthau (1947: 10, 1971: 620) 
that it requires an Übermensch in the form of encyclopaedic knowledge, virtue, and wisdom 
to surpass dichotomous thinking and re-establish the political. 
 
Technologisation. Morgenthau (1973) also criticised modern democracies for their techno-
logical penetration of social life, which he saw as causing two further de-humanising effects. 
First, the technological interlocking of social life leads to increased complexities. Although 
technological advancements accelerate individualisation in modern democracies as people 
acquire abilities to transcend spatial and temporal restrictions in order to participate in nu-
merous forms of sociation, technologisation also requires people to meticulously structure 
their lives in a regulatory framework, such as a timetable, as the sociologist Hartmut Rosa 
(2005: 97-100) recently emphasised. However, due to the acceleration of social life, the sus-
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ceptibility of these regulatory frameworks is high. In cases of dysfunction, social life not only 
loses its synchronicity, but also comes to a standstill altogether. As Morgenthau (1960a, 
1972) argued in accordance with Hannah Arendt (1953: 323, 1958), people are turned from 
a homo faber into an animal laborans not only in labour terms, but their socio-political life-
worlds are also constrained by various technological requirements. 
Second, technologisation allows for the mass-production of consumer goods which in mod-
ern democracies compensate for the loss of identity. This is the case because the common 
realms of identity-creation – politics and economy – have been de-humanised. People, albe-
it being a zoon politikon as Morgenthau agreed with Aristotle (Lang 2004), cannot get in-
volved as critical citizens because their drive to prove themselves (Bewährungstrieb)6 is 
suppressed. Modern marketing strategies seize this yearning for identity by focusing on the 
‘shop-window quality of things’ (Simmel 1997: 257) to create a frantic and constant urge to 
consume commodities as a replacement for identity. For Morgenthau (1960a: 69, 1960b: 
215, 1972: 23) (again in agreement with Arendt), this not only creates a ‘society of waste,’ 
but also reifies identity.  
 
Scientification. The final aspect Morgenthau repeatedly criticised about modern democra-
cies is the scientification of politics. Like other émigré scholars, such as Eric Voegelin (HJM 
60), he was sceptical of the promises of the application of natural science methods to poli-
tics. Still, as the common usage of the term political science suggests, this “separationist 
movement” – to which Morgenthau can be attributed – unsuccessfully opposed the positiv-
istic dominance. The rising Cold War solicited ideological reifications and politics was asked 
to provide the scientific credentials for this status quo. Contrary to Leonard White and other 
members of Chicago’s ‘Merriam fraction’ (Postscript 1984: 370), who encouraged this scien-
tification for the advancement of American liberalism (Jütersonke 2010: 131-5), Morgen-
thau (1944: 176, 1949: 1) was suspicious of the epistemological value of such positivistic-
structuralist approaches to politics because they do not concede a vital role to the hu-
man. Rather than focusing on the creative abilities of humans to act together and create a 
compromise through alignment of interests, as Morgenthau suggested in his work, structur-
alist approaches often promote a belligerent outlook of the world. In these approaches, the 
nation-state is considered as an ‘organismic’ (Waltz 1954: 178) unit that attempts to survive 
in an anarchical structure. This unquestioned acceptance of ontological assumptions causes 
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a reification of politics. Eventually, due to this scientification, political science in general and 
IR in particular omitted the distinction between the analytical and the normative. From the 
analytical assumption of anarchy, normative conclusions and measures were derived in or-
der to secure one’s survival. However, these conclusions were not phrased in normative 
terms, but presented as a logical reasoning from which foreign policy guidelines were pro-
duced (Behr 2010: 206-7). 
 
The political, normative power, and the de-politicisation of politics 
To understand the empirical effects of this de-humanisation on modern democracies, i.e. 
the de-politicisation of politics, we have to first address Morgenthau’s concept of the politi-
cal and the relevance of power for it.  
As Morgenthau encapsulated all that it takes to understand the concept of the political, let 
us first recall his well-known definition from Politics Among Nations. At the beginning of this 
textbook Morgenthau (1985: 5) defined ‘international politics [as] the concept of interest 
defined in terms of power.’ In order to disentangle this definition of the political, and it is of 
no relevance here if the domestic or international scene is addressed, we have to turn to his 
doctoral dissertation from 1929 in which Morgenthau offered his first substantial elabora-
tion of this concept. There, he argued that the political has no fixed substance; rather it is a 
quality, colouring (Färbung), or tone (tonalité) as referred to four years later (Morgenthau 
1933: 32). ‘A question which is of political nature today can be bereft of any political mean-
ing tomorrow’ (Morgenthau 1929: 67; my translation). This means that the political occurs 
when humans pursue their interests through a dialogue. Any issue or substance can become 
political if people take an increased interest in it. Morgenthau operated on the assumption 
that this pursuit of interests in collectivity is part of human nature, as he elaborated in an 
unpublished manuscript on the Derivation of the Political from the Nature of Man in 1930 
(HJM 151). It is part of human nature because it is only through this pursuit that involved 
parties can assure themselves of their own strengths and capabilities and thereby derive 
meaning about their own self. This, what Morgenthau perceived to be a natural collective 
pursuit of interests, eventually provides people with power.  
Morgenthau’s concept of power is contested in IR, partly because of his failure to distin-
guish between his empirical and normative concepts of power following his forced migra-
tion to the USA. We have no concrete evidence as to why Morgenthau did not define his 
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concepts as sharply in his English writings as he did in his German and French ones. One 
reason might have been the unfavourable climate towards Germany during and shortly after 
the Second World War, which caused Morgenthau to separate himself from his past. Ac-
cording to Lebow (2003: 219), a former student of Morgenthau, we know that ‘questions 
about his German past were taboo.’ A second reason was presumably the shift of interest 
from purely theoretical studies towards works with a greater focus on contemporary policy 
issues (Guzzini 1998: 24).7 Still, this does not settle the question of why Morgenthau did not 
attempt to improve the clarity of his concepts, particularly as he had realised this problem 
early. To Michael Oakeshott Morgenthau wrote in 1948   
 
that my attempts to make clear the distinctions between rationalism and rational in-
quiry, scientism and science, were in vain. I think I was fully aware of the importance 
and difficulty of these distinctions when I wrote the book, and it is now obvious to 
me that I have failed in the task to make my meaning clear (HJM 44). 
 
Although this question is central to the contextualisation of his Weltanschauung, it can be 
left unaddressed in this article as we have the opportunity to turn to his early writings 
where Morgenthau (1930a: 9, 1933: 43, 1934: 33) meticulously distinguished between pow-
er (Macht, pouvoir) understood as empirical power and puissance (Kraft) understood as 
normative power. Whereas Morgenthau regarded the former as the capacity of one or more 
people to dominate others psychologically and/or physically – a definition espoused by Sig-
mund Freud and Max Weber (Williams 2004; Schuett 2007; Neacsu 2010) –, it is the latter 
form of power that he argued as constituting the political realm. In pursuit of their interests, 
people come together, exchange their ideas in a cognitive process, which Morgenthau 
(1933: 73) termed ‘discussion’, and thereby act altogether to create a society that is com-
mitted to the common good. In this sense, Morgenthau’s notion of the political goes beyond 
post-structuralist accounts if we follow Edkins’s assessment. According to her, post-
structuralism argues that the political has ‘to do with the establishment of that very social 
order which sets out a particular, historically specific account of what counts as politics’ (Ed-
kins 1999: 2) and is therefore the moment when a new political order is created, regardless 
of what this new order looks like. Hence, there is uncertainty among its creators about the 
final objectification of this order, but it is also a moment of openness characterised by a 
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dispute among them as they all attempt to reify their social and political ideals (Edkins 1999: 
7-9). For Morgenthau, the political is not a moment, but – evoking Simmel’s notion of socia-
tion – a constant and collective process through which the changing interests of people find 
their expression. As a vital outlet, Morgenthau argued that this process had to be actively 
preserved.  
Having established the centrality of the political for modern democracies, the empirical re-
sult of the de-humanisation caused by the ideological, technological, and scientific reifica-
tion can now be assessed. As Morgenthau (1933: 87) remarked in the conclusion of La No-
tion du Politique, this de-humanisation essentially de-politicises (dépolitisé) politics because 
it disempowers people. 
For Morgenthau, de-politicisation occurred because the political was eliminated from poli-
tics. The pursuit of people’s interests expressed in scrutiny or criticism became considered 
as a menace to the institutionalised political status quo rather than its constitutive factor 
(Morgenthau 1952a). Its questioning seemed at times threatening, when the dominant lib-
eral ideology in modern democracies was challenged, as happened during the McCarthy-Era 
in the USA during the late 1940s and 1950s, and at times unqualified as the de-
humanisation of modern democracies led to a hubris of thought. Ideologically, the narrative 
of freedom instilled the urge to maintain the status quo because living in the “Free World” 
had to be safeguarded from the atrocities of the “Eastern Bloc”, but also because political 
science itself pioneered this hubris. By not distinguishing between analytical and normative 
elements in their approaches, normative assumptions were presented as logical reasoning 
and their foreign policy advice veered more towards parameters than guidelines. Therefore, 
criticism seemed unqualified if not preposterous and humans could only resort to apathy or 
violence to express criticism (Morgenthau 1974: 16-17). According to Morgenthau, this is 
what had happened during the student protests in the 1960s:  
 
What the students revolt against in the universities is what they are revolting against 
in the world at large. That world, thoroughly secularized and dedicated to the pro-
duction of consumer goods and weapons of mass destruction, has lost its meaning ... 
That world is also thoroughly mechanized and bureaucratized. Thus it diminishes the 
individual who must rely on others rather than himself for the satisfaction of his 
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wants, from the necessities of life to his spiritual and philosophical longings (HJM 43; 
1968a: 9). 
 
Being unable to critically discuss existential questions about the society students lived in, in 
particular the definition of a common good, they had to resort to violence to make them-
selves heard. Therefore, politics in modern democracies was reduced to its institutions – it 
was reified, so to speak – but the political, hence the quality or colouring of issues, was elim-
inated from politics.  
 
The national interest as an epistemological tool to ensure the political 
In order to confront this elimination of the political in modern democracies, Morgenthau 
(1950b, 1951, 1952a) introduced his understanding of the national interest into American 
political discourses beginning in the late 1940s. In essence, he had it already developed in La 
Notion du Politique in which he distinguished between political tensions and legal-political 
disputes (différends). Morgenthau’s national interest is a concept that in its diversity and 
quantifiable inconceivability repeatedly led to misunderstandings among practitioners and 
academics alike because, as Michael Smith (1986: 110) remarked, ‘[h]ow one defines the 
national interest depends on the values he espouses and the way he ranks them’ (similar: 
Scheuerman 2009: 85). Furthermore, despite its terminology, the national interest is not 
restricted to the nation-state, but is applicable to any sociation. 
Given Morgenthau’s concept of the political as previously discussed, it becomes clear that 
Lebow (2003: 245) is correct in his assessment of the national interest as a ‘fluid concept.’ 
Morgenthau considered it to be an epistemological tool with which to bring the various po-
tentially divergent interests into a ‘rational order’ (Morgenthau 1952b: 976). As noted by 
Véronique Pin-Fat (2005: 232), this rationality would be achieved through a hierarchisation 
of interests in a society, beginning from the ones that secure survival. Therefore, the na-
tional interest was understood as a flexible concept with which to consider the antagonism 
of interests8, adapt to changes in these interests, and ensure through their classification 
that all of them are appreciated in the definition and pursuit of the common good. Morgen-
thau was convinced that outbreaks of violence could be minimised through the pursuance 
of the national interest, as all interests could be pursued and would be considered according 
to their puissance, i.e. public support. 
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This demonstrates that for a concept like the national interest to work effectively in the 
sense that the political is ensured, particular people with strong qualities, such as those 
Morgenthau had found in Nietzsche’s Übermensch, are required to create a rational order. 
In his American writings, Morgenthau employed the notion of the statesman to identify 
these qualities, but he shaped the conviction that strong political leadership is necessary in a 
democracy to facilitate the expression of the antagonism of interests already in his earliest 
German writings. Morgenthau (1930b) had found an example of such a statesman in the 
late German Minister of Foreign Affairs, Gustav Stresemann, whom he recognised as the 
‘creator’ (Schöpfer) of German foreign politics. Stresemann had peacefully reintroduced 
Germany into the community of states. According to Morgenthau, Stresemann and other 
politicians that he held in high esteem, such as Abraham Lincoln and Dean Acheson, had 
offered the particular human quality of wisdom. As he remarked in some of his latest writ-
ings: 
 
[w]isdom is the gift of intuition, and political wisdom is the gift to grasp intuitively 
the quality of diverse interests and power in the present and future and the impact 
of different actions upon them. Political wisdom, understood as sound political 
judgement, cannot be learned; it is a gift of nature … As such, it can be deepened 
and developed by example, experience, and study (Morgenthau 1971: 620, 1972: 45). 
 
Although Morgenthau considered wisdom to be a “gift of nature”, it was nonetheless based 
on values that could be acquired. According to Anthony Lang (2007: 29), these values are 
closely related to Aristotle’s ideal of a virtuous person who is characterised through prudent 
demeanour, courage, and sound judgement on the basis of knowledge and experience. Due 
to Morgenthau’s personal experiences as a Jew in an anti-Semitic society and being a ‘dou-
ble exile’ (HJM 22), a fourth feature can be added here to wisdom: alienation (Neacsu 2010: 
104). Since Morgenthau (1945: 18) always regarded politics as a choice among evils, he be-
lieved that the task of a politician was to ‘choose the lesser evil.’ Alienation enables him/her 
to do so because it provides the politician in combination with a profound education with 
the ability to compare and weigh the importance of interests due to an unbiased political 
judgement. Wisdom was therefore a concept for Morgenthau to bring the human factor 
back into politics as it was directly opposed to positivistic attempts to socially plan the world. 
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Rather than hoping to make the world its subject through the establishment of social laws 
by presenting ‘a series of hypothetical possibilities, each of which may occur under certain 
conditions and which of them will occur is anybody’s guess’ (Morgenthau 1944: 176, 1949: 
1), wisdom allows the politician to react to the dynamics of interests and to act by pursuing 
those that best suit the public. Thus, through wisdom the politician can be like Caesar, a 
leader willing ‘to cross the Rubicon not knowing how deep and turbulent the river is, or 
what he will find on the other side’ (Morgenthau 1962: 103). To remain in Morgenthau’s 
diction, wisdom does not remove insecurity, but it provides the certainty that crossing the 
river is the best solution for all.  
 
Scholarship as dissidence: the restoration of the political  
With the national interest, Morgenthau provided practitioners with a concept to ensure the 
political, but it cannot restore it. Instead, Morgenthau entrusted this task to his own sodality. 
For Morgenthau, scholarship had an obligation to counter the tendency towards de-
humanisation and guide people to attempt the restoration of the political. He insisted that 
scholarship has to make dissidence its guiding principle as also Muriel Cozette emphasises. 
She contends that Morgenthau argued for a scholarship that agitates as the ‘conscience of 
time’, providing a ‘corrective’ (Cozette 2008: 11-12; original emphasis) for politics. Equally, 
Vibeke Schou Tjalve (2008: 9) identified Morgenthau’s quest as an ‘embedded … dissent’ 
demonstrating the importance Morgenthau placed on scholarship. With his understanding 
of the role of scholarship, Morgenthau foreshadowed current discourses in critical IR-theory. 
One of the latest contributions to this discourse on the role of scholarship was provided by 
Brent Steele who referred to Michel Foucault’s parrhesia. A scholar ought to say ‘... what is 
true because he knows that it is true, and he knows that it is true because it is really true’ 
(Foucault, in Steele 2010: 50; original emphasis). Steele informs his readers that truth in this 
sense is intersubjective as it is constructed in dialogue and pragmatic as this intersubjectivity 
occurs within a specific time and space. Furthermore, parrhesia is for Steele (2010: 51) pri-
marily directed towards the academic field as a critique of the power-relations that influ-
ence the construction and implementation of knowledge.  
Arguing that Morgenthau considered scholarship as dissidence propagates a similar under-
standing of truth. Morgenthau did not claim universalism in the sense of being in the pos-
session of absolute knowledge that only has to be passed on to other people. He did not 
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even consider scholars to be able to reach the condition of Karl Mannheim’s “free-floating 
intelligentsia” (Morgenthau 1984: 14) as nobody could in his/her political thinking transcend 
the limits of one’s own perspective. However, Morgenthau’s argumentation goes beyond 
Steele. Scholarship meant for Morgenthau, and this is evidenced in his countless civic en-
gagements, not to restrict oneself to the academic field, but to act in the public sphere. 
Steele (2010: 53) expresses the well-considered caveat that the scholar might lose the abil-
ity to “speak truth to power” in the public realm due to its different knowledge-power rela-
tions. However, Morgenthau was well aware of this problem (Lebow 2003: 247-8). In order 
to avoid it, he proposed that scholars act in this realm in accordance with Socratic maieutics. 
He attempted to decipher political interests of people by establishing a dialogue with them 
and thereby creating a forum in which the political can re-evolve, rather than telling people 
“the truth”. Scholars have to act as facilitators of the political through which people can 
transcend the de-humanisation of modern democracies by succouring them to become crit-
ical citizens in the form of what Arendt (1978: 65-6) called ‘conscious pariah’; this would 
free them in their thoughts and actions from ideological, technological, and scientific con-
straints, thereby allowing them to contribute again (in an act of ‘amor mundi’ (Young-Bruehl 
1982: 324)) to the creation of their life-world.  
However, attempting to persuade others of their human capacities and challenge vested 
interests by acting as a critical corrective of contemporary de-humanising forms of sociation 
causes discomfort among contemporaries by questioning their habitual ways of thinking. 
Eventually, the scholar even has to expect negative personal consequences (Morgenthau 
1955: 446-7) as also Steele (2010: 58) highlights. Records of negative personal consequences 
for Morgenthau are numerous. Several of his political efforts were torpedoed because his 
understanding of scholarship was not well received at the height of the Cold War, when crit-
ical thinking that questioned the foundations of common beliefs was considered a threat to 
society. This is evidenced in the consequences he faced for encouraging Germany to accept 
the Oder-Neisse-border with Poland in 1961 and criticising the USA for its intervention in 
Indochina. For example, in “the week” section of the National Review from 15 June 1965, 
we read that ‘Professor Hans Morgenthau’s hyperactive role as a protester against our poli-
cy in Vietnam is embarrassing many of his friends, and may even be embarrassing to himself, 
who is not used to the kind of self-exposure he is submitting to or to the company he finds 
himself keeping’ (HJM 20).  
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Apart from personal attacks, his career also suffered. After criticising the American govern-
ment over the Vietnam War, Morgenthau was never again appointed as a consultant to any 
governmental department and his candidature for the presidency of the American Political 
Science Association in 1970 was impeded (Lebow 2003: 240; Cozette 2008: 17; HJM 4). The 
correspondence between Arendt and Mary McCarthy (1995: 217) indicates that Morgen-
thau was affected by such disrepute. After publishing We are Deluding Ourselves in Vietnam 
in the New York Times Magazine in 1965, the journalist Joseph Alsop called Morgenthau’s 
stance ‘pompous ignorance.’ However, if one is able to consider Morgenthau’s arguments 
more thoroughly, one is left astonished. In one such moment, Walter Lippmann is recorded 
to have said: ‘How curious you [Morgenthau] are misunderstood. You are the most moral 
thinker I know’ (Quoted after: Thompson 1980-1: 197). 
Social sciences in general and IR in particular did not live up to Morgenthau’s expectations 
as evidenced in the “Quiz Show Scandal” of 1959. The scandal revolved around Charles Van 
Doren, a scholar at Columbia University, who participated in a popular game show that was 
later to found to be fraudulent (Cozette 2008: 15). This told Morgenthau that even in his 
sodality, scholars were not always committed to truth in all conscience and it was for this 
reason that Morgenthau reacted to this scandal so furiously. For similar reasons, he would 
also accuse Carl Schmitt of lacking the necessary ‘geistig-seelische Zentrum’ (spiritual-moral 
centre) (Morgenthau 1932). Van Doren had breached this commitment to truth, and Mor-
genthau (1959: 17, 1960b: 344) believed that a scholar like Van Doren was ‘not so much the 
corruptor of the code by which he is supposed to live as its destroyer.’ Furthermore, IR act-
ed not as a critical corrective of the political status quo, but through its positivisation even 
contributed to modern de-humanisation. Morgenthau (1966b: 73) believed that IR ‘re-
treat[s] into the trivial, the formal, the methodological, the purely theoretical, the remotely 
historical – in short the politically irrelevant’ rather than discussing politically relevant issues 
that concern the well-being and interests of people. Since it did not consider the processual 
character of human existence, Morgenthau believed that IR faced the same problem as (in-
ternational) law had during the interwar-period. It became sterile and eventually created a 
systemic outlook on the world in which the human was no longer considered. Problems or 
conflicts in the political realm became issues of structural constraints in which remedy 
would be sought through technological measures and social planning (Morgenthau 1932, 
1966b). However, despite the shattering of his hopes for scholarship as dissidence, Morgen-
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thau did not argue to retreat to academia, but only insisted more fervently on the assertion 
of scholars in the public realm, as it is only then that IR could claim significance.  
 
Conclusion 
The objective of this article was to demonstrate that Morgenthau’s thought offers an epis-
temological and normative refinement for contemporary IR-theory. The marginalisation 
Morgenthau experienced enabled him to develop a unique way of thinking with regard to 
the intellectual ‘interaction ritual chains’ (Collins 1998: 29) of German humanities of the late 
19th and early 20th centuries of which the implications for IR-theory have yet to be fully ap-
preciated. To this end, emphasis has been placed on the human condition of politics and the 
eventual re-humanisation of modern democracies as the guiding principle of Morgenthau’s 
Weltanschauung and his legacy for contemporary IR-theory. The fundamental respect for 
human beings (Scheuerman 2011: 100) and arguing for the possibility to exhaust their abili-
ties inspired Morgenthau and should continue to inspire us today. To illustrate this episte-
mological and normative refinement, the concluding section of this article considers the 
Fukushima Daiichi nuclear disaster after the Tōhoku earthquake and tsunami in March 2011.  
A Morgenthauian inspired IR-theory would have dismissed Japanese energy policy for pre-
venting a public debate as the antagonism of interests was suppressed. Similar to govern-
mental reactions in the European Union to the ongoing financial crisis, Japanese policy deci-
sions were declared to be “without alternative.”9 Energy policy was not discussed in terms 
of alternatives or reduction of energy consumption, but as a scientific problem to be solved 
in order to secure Japan’s energy consumption. This suppression was intensified through an 
indoctrination of the public by the electric utility industry using various means of lobbying 
and/or advertising and the iconisation of nuclear energy in popular culture through anime 
characters such as Astro Boy (Tetsuwan Atomu). The Japanese government even steered the 
public semiosis by employing a positively connoted term for nuclear in terms of energy 
(genshi ryoku) and a negatively connoted one for weaponry (kaku heki). This de-
humanisation through the ideologisation, technologisation, and scientification of Japanese 
energy policy had dramatic consequences for the population. In a country with limited hab-
itable space, an entire area was radioactively contaminated and the effects for the people’s 
health will only become apparent in the years to come. Epistemologically, this implies that 
scholars are not intended to tell people “the truth” as scientifically deduced through grand 
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theories. Knowledge is only created by humans through dialogue for and in a particular 
temporal and spatial context. Therefore, scholarship for Morgenthau was intended to criti-
cally reflect the knowledge-power relations that shape social life-worlds. His contribution 
seems humble, but we should not overestimate ourselves. It requires the willingness and 
ability to self-reflect and in such action the danger of ostracism looms large. 
Furthermore, Morgenthau’s human condition of politics also comprises a normative implica-
tion to IR-theory as it does not separate the political from politics. This separation occurs 
when the political is conceived as being merely the moment of the establishment of a new 
political order, i.e. politics. It would subject the latter to positivistic institutionalism and re-
strict itself to a critical examination of politics while the political would be uncritically ap-
praised as the moment of change, regardless of its content. A Morgenthauian inspired 
scholarship, by contrast, reminds IR-scholars to put the focus on the main factor of their 
trade: the human. This human factor is characterised for Morgenthau in the political as it is 
this dynamic and constant realm where people act together to create their life-world by 
competing for the assertion and eventual alignment of their interests. Consequently, analys-
ing modern democracies cannot only imply for IR-theory to critically assess the provisional 
nature of politics, but especially within politics. Conceptualising the political like Morgen-
thau intends to stabilise modern democracies as it seeks ways to restore and ensure the 
political within politics. With his understanding of the national interest Morgenthau con-
ceived a concept which was designed to achieve the latter. In the case of Japan, this would 
have meant that politicians would have laid emphasis on the perpetuation of a public dia-
logue in which all interests regarding nuclear energy could have been voiced. Furthermore, 
Morgenthau’s normativity particularly expresses itself in the re-politicising ability he afford-
ed to scholarship. To induce conditions for people to empower themselves through estab-
lishing such a dialogue, Morgenthau wanted to draw the public’s attention to de-
humanising developments in modern democracies.  
Therefore, a Morgenthauian inspired scholarship is an addition to current discourses in IR-
theory as it searches for ways to engage with the public. The feasibility of Morgenthau’s 
solution was not assessed herein, but it is noted that he developed a way through which 
public engagement could take place. Whatever we make of Morgenthau’s solutions for the 
re-politicisation of social life, IR-theory cannot restrict itself to the academic field due to the 
danger of having to succumb to public knowledge-power relations. Instead, it must look for 
18 
 
ways to reduce this danger and assist in ensuring that current trends of re-politicisation, 
such as a growing critical stance towards nuclear energy in Japan or the mass-
demonstrations in Israel and the USA for more social equality, do not turn into violence as 
was the case in the suburbs of Paris and London. 
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1 Examples are: Tickner (1991), Keohane (1993), or George (1995). 
2 Taking up Morgenthau’s questions from 1933 has not only conceptual implications, but also methodological 
ones. Introducing the concept of Weltanschauung was deliberate because Morgenthau’s work cannot be sepa-
rated from his life. In agreement with Henry Kissinger (1980: 14) and Smith (1986: 226), it is argued that Mor-
genthau’s life was his work and his work his life. Classifying his Weltanschauung as a theory would fall short of 
aptly depicting this processual character. To visualise this processuality the German term is used rather than 
the more static world-view. Methodologically, this implies that we cannot analyse Morgenthau in isolation 
because this de-contextualised and/or selective reading may lead to misinterpretations of his major concepts 
as has occurred in the past. In order to solve this problem, this article follows a panoptical approach to Mor-
genthau’s work as it enables IR-scholars to understand his concepts in consideration of the contexts of their 
creation and employment and in relation to linguistic conventions at that time (Kosselleck 2010: 56-76). This is 
the case because the intellectual background rests upon these conventions as they ‘form the universe of all 
potentially meaningful expressions at specific time in a specific culture’ (Muslow and Mahler 2010: 10; my 
translation) upon which it will be possible to put Morgenthau’s concepts into and relate them to the history of 
ideas. Therefore, to avoid screening Morgenthau’s concepts through the lenses of 21st century IR-theory, a 
comprehensive reading of Morgenthau’s published work was executed, analogies were drawn from Morgen-
thau’s work to other scholars active at that time and culture, and comprehensive archival work was undertak-
en to examine his unpublished studies and correspondence.  
3 This term is borrowed from Hartmut Behr (2010) who argues that scientification signifies the process of firm-
ly grounding positivism as the only viable framework for IR-theorising. 
4 HJM stands for the Hans J. Morgenthau Archive at the Library of Congress. The number indicates the respec-
tive container. 
5 The term marginalisation refers to Morgenthau’s status as a marginal man in Robert Park’s sense: ‘fate has 
condemned [Morgenthau] to live in two societies and in two, not merely different but antagonistic, cultures’ 
(Park, in: Golovensky 1952: 334). Using this understanding of marginalisation does not mean that Morgenthau 
did not have a brilliant academic career, but the differences in the epistemological traditions in the USA and 
Continental Europe led to an interpretation of Morgenthau’s work that was merely a crude caricature.  
6 Robert Schuett (2007: 59) uses the term ‘the instinct of self-assertion’ to translate Bewährungstrieb. However, 
translating it as the drive to prove oneself is closer to the German meaning and Morgenthau (1974: 16) also 
translated it this way. 
7 A linguistic explanation is that – other than in German or French – the term “power” in English entails empiri-
cal and normative components because power can be used to describe any human effort to achieve a specific 
end (Geuss 2008: 27). 
8 The author owes this expression to Hartmut Behr.  
9 The German chancellor Angela Merkel has used the term “without alternative” (alternativlos) while arguing 
for financial aid to Greece on 2 May 2010.  
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